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In the Supre1ne Court of the 
State of Utah 
HOWARD ANDERSON, ET AL, 
Petitioners and Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH COUNTY AND THE BOARD 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with the .A:ppellants' Statement of 
Facts except to add the following: 
Within a few weeks after the Utah County elections 
were held in the fall of 1960, a suit was filed by the· un-
successful Democratie candidates, Marcellus Nielsen and 
David Greenwood, seeking to reverse the election result 
(T. 35, 36). The Appellants were employees of the Utah 
County Road Department under Nielsen, and all but one 
gave money to help finance this lawsuit. Most gave amounts 
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of $60.00 or $100.00 each (Findings of Fact Par. 6, T. 36). 
This, despite the fact that many of the employees who con-
tributed :had been employed by Utah County under a pre-
vious Republican administration, had obtained Republican 
party clearances and had been supervised by ~sterling D. 
Jones as County Commission (T. 49-55). 
Commissioner Jones testified that after these employ-
ees had seen fit to inject themselves into a suit to unseat 
him that "I could not expect their loyalty, that they could 
not be loyal to me"· (T. 33). The Trial Court found as a 
fact that Jones and .through him the Utah County Com-
mission 'had a dual motive in the firing-first, that the em-
ployees could not be entirely loyal, and second, because they 
were members of the Democratic party and not members 
of the Republican party (Findings of Fact par. 8). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
IS NOT AN UNWARRANTED JUDICIAL VETO OF 
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION. 
POINT II 
THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL RULES OF STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTENT DO NOT RE-
QUIRE THE INCLUSION OF ALL TYPES O~F ASSO-
CIATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACf. 
POINT m 
P0'LITICAL PARTIES ARE NOT CONTEMPLATED 
BY THE ACT. 
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3 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE STATUTE WERE TO COVER PO-
LITICAL PARTIES, IT WAS NOT VIOLATED SINCE 
THE APPELLANTS WERE D·ISCHARGED FOR TWO 
REASONS, ONE POLITICAL AND THE OTHER NON-
POLITICAL. 
POINT V 
IF UTAH'S "RIGHT TO WORK" LAW IS INTER-
PRETED TO INCLUDE POLITICAL PARTIES WITillN 
THE PHRASE ''. . . ANY OTHER TYPE O:F ASSOCIA-
TION . . ." IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE 
OF THE PO·LICE POWER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANJD1UM DECISION 
IS NOT AN UNWARRANTED JUDICIAL V:ETO. OF 
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION. 
We agree with the language of the Rowley case quoted 
by the Appellants at page 11 of their brief. (Rowley vs. 
Public Service Commission, 112 Utah 116, 185 Pac. 2nd 
514). Particularly would we emphasize the language which 
says: 
"On the other hand, when the legislative intent 
is not clear and certain, and a literal interpretation of 
the language of the statute gives an absurd result, then 
the court is justified in ~searching the enactment for 
further indications of legislative intent. These indi-
cations can be determined by the wording ~If the act 
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4 
or by considering the underlying reasons and neces-
sity m the amendments and the purposes to be accom-
plished.'' 
Since political parties are not specifically mentioned in 
the Right to Work Act, the Trial Court had to decide 
whether the act included political parties. The meaning 
of "or other associations" lhad to be determined. Is a po-
litical party an "association" within the meaning of the 
act? 
The Trial Court held that so to find would "result in 
finding an unreasonable and absurd intention on the part 
of the legislature.'' It would hamstring elected officials 
and a huge segment of public employees- would be left with 
no statutory law fixing their work standards and tenure. 
The Trial Judge simply says that the legislature could not 
have intended such an absurd result. 
Appellants frankly concede at page 8 of their brief that 
their case rests upon the premise that the phrase "or any 
other type of association" is all inclusive. Suppose some 
particular church had a policy to hire only ministers who 
were members of that church or, saying it in another way, 
had a policy not to hire ministers of any other faith but 
their own. Under the Appellants' interpretation the church 
could not refuse to hire ministers for this reason because 
such refusal would violate the Right to Work Law. This 
absurd result is a sample of the multitude of ridiculous and 
unintended situations which would attend the application 
of the statute if appellants' inte11>retation were correct. 
That the c:ourt may reject an unreasonable or absurd 
construction of a statute is set forth in 50 Am Jur (Stat-
utes) Sec. 377, p. 385-389, where the text says in part at 
p. 385-387: 
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5 
"A statute subject to iJ.lterpretation is presumed 
not to have been intended to produce absurd conse-
quences, but to have th€1 most reasonable operati~ 
that its language permits, and it is a general~rule that 
where a statute is ambiguous in terms and fairly sus-
ceptible of two constructions, the Wlreasonableness or 
absurdity which may follow one ~oonstrnction or the 
other may properly be ~considered. In some eases in-
volving the construction of a statute, considerations 
of what is reasonable are even regarded as having 
potent influence. If possible, doubtlul provisions should 
be given a reasonable, rational, sensible, and intelli-
gent construction. Unreasonable, absurd, or nd1eu-~ . 
lous ~consequences should be avoided." 
This Court approves this principle and so announced 
in Norvill vs. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah·170; 97 Pac. 
2nd 937, referred to -in Appellants' brief at p. 11 and also in 
Rowley vs. Public Ser\.rice Commission, Supra. 
POINT II 
THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL RULES OF STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTENT . po NOT RE-
QillRE THE IN,CLUSION OF ALL 'fy,PES OF ASSO-
CIATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACf. 
Respondents submit that Utah's Right to Work Stat-
ute was intended to cover only labor organizations and not 
political parties and all other organizations. U. C. A. 34-
16-2 reads: 
"It is hereby declared to be the public policy of 
the State of Utah that the right of persons to work 
. . . shall not be denied . . . on account of member-
ship or non-membership in any labor union, labor or-
ganization or any other type of organization ... " 
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The rule of statutory construction called Ejusdem 
Generis (of the same kind, class or nature) ean reasonably 
and justifiably be applied to this statute and to the Right 
to Work Law in general. The statute would then read: 
''The . . . right . . . to work . . . shall not be de-
nied . . . on account of membership oc non-member-
ship in any labor union, labor organization, or any 
other type of (labor) organization.'' 
The general rule is set forth in 82 CJS Sec. 332 p. 658 
and in 50 Am. Jm. Sec. 249 p. 244-246 where the following 
appears: 
"General and specific words in a statute whi~1-I are 
associated together, and which are capable of an anal-
ogous meaning, take ·color from each other, so that 
the general words are restricted to a sense analogous 
to the less general. Under this rule, general terms in 
a statute may be regarded as limited by subsequent 
more specific terms. Similarly, in accordance with 
what is ·commonly known as the rule of Ejusden1 Gen-
eris, where, in a statute, general words follow a desig-
nation of partieular subjects or classes of persons, the 
meaning of the general words will ordinarily be pre-
sumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the par-
ticular designation and as including only things or per-
sons of the same kind, class, character, or nature as 
those specifically enumerarted. The general words are 
deemed to have been used, not to the wide extent which 
they might bear if standing alone, but as related to 
words of more definite and particular mea.rrlng \vith 
which they are associated. In accordance with the 
rule of Ejusdem Generis, such tenns as "other," other 
thing," "other persons," "otheiWise," or "any other," 
when preceded by a specific enumeration, are con1-
monly given a restricted meaning, and limited to ar-
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7 
ticles of the same nature as .those previously described. 
The rule of Ejusdem Generis has been declared to be 
specific application of the broader maxim of ''noscitur 
a sociis,'' which is discussed in other sections of this 
subdivision.'' 
A 'collection of cases on the doctrine is set forth in 14 
Words and Phrases at p. 212-221. 
This Court has recently approved and applied the doc-
trine in Donahue vs. Warner Brothers P!ictures Distribu-
ting Corporation, 272 Pac. 2nd 177, 2 Utah 2nd 256; W. S. 
Hatch Company vs. Public Servi-ce Commission, 277 Pac. 
2nd 809, 3 ·Utah 2nd 7 and Memorial Gardens of the Val-
ley, Incorporated vs. Love, 300 Pac. 2nd 628, 5 Utah 2nd 
270. 
With respect to the proffered exhibit 1, a letter sent 
by the then Governor, J. Bracken Lee, the Court properly 
excluded the evidence. First, because the letter does not 
mention political parties and, therefore, is of no use to the 
Court and also the same is inadmissible as incompetent (T. 
65, 66) . Is this letter admissible as an "executive view" as 
claimed on page 21 of Appellants' brief? In Fleming vs. 
Mohawk Wrecking and Lumber Company, 331 U. S. 111, 
cited by Appellants as authority for admissibility of ex-
hibit 1, the Court was construing an act which had been 
repeatedly construed by the President of the United States. 
We emphasize the words "had been" since the Court was 
referring to an executive experience in ,construing the act. 
In E. C. Olsen Company vs. Starte Tax Commission, 
109 Utah 563, 168 Pac. 2nd 324, also cited by Appellants 
as authority for the admission of exhibit 1, the Court states 
at page 332 in 168 Pac. 2nd that: 
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'.'Where there is an ambiguity in the 'statute as 
to wh€!1Jher the latter does or does not cover a partie-
. , ula~ , m~r _ a praJCtieal construction~··: of· rthe. ·statute 
; shown to 'have been the accepted construction of the 
agency charged with administering the matters in ques-
tion under the statute will be one factor which the 
Court may take into consideration as persuasive as to 
the meaning of the statute." 
, The Court then found that the facts of that case "do 
not show a practieal interpretation of the statute by the 
Tax Commission.'' 
It is submitted that forn1er Governor Lee's opinion of· -
the legal meaning of the startute given tiefore passag~ of -
the act in a letter to legislators and other interested per~ 
sons is not "practical interpretation of the statuteH and is -
a legal conclusion (T. 62, 63) . 
For the same reason oral testimony about what_ the 
former Governor believed the law to have meant prio·r to 
its passage, was also properly excluded by the Trial CoUrt.··_· 
POINT m 
·POLITICAL PARTIES ARE. NOT. CONTEMPLATED· 
BY THE ACT. 
Respondents coneede that the Utah Right to Work stat-
ute has different wording than other Right to; Work Stat-
utes. Urtah ·has made the act apply to the State and to its 
politi·cal subdivisions and doeS so by Specifically defining · · 
employer to include all persons, ~sJ ·. assQci.ations, -~ 
rations, the Starte of Utah, irts counties, ·cities, school dis-
tricts, and other political subdivisions. If the, legislature 
·had intended the act to apply to political parties, it could 
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have made it crystal clear by simply saying so. Merely be-
cause the legislature broadened the meaning of employer 
to include the State and its subdivisions, does not per se 
mean that every conceivable kind of association is subject 
to the act. 
Respondents submit that while the opinion of the dis-
tinguished President of the Chwch of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints is interesting and perhaps states a concept 
many would agree with, such statement is not in the rec-
ord and in any event ·is of no probative value in determin-
ing the intent of the legislature in this case. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THIE STATUTE WERE TO COVER PO-
LITICAL PARTIES, IT WAS NOT VIOLATED SINCE 
THE APPELLANTS WERE DISCHARGED FOR 1WO 
REASONS, ONE POLITICAL AND THE OTHER NO·N-
POLITICAL. 
The Trial Court f.ound as a fact that the Appellants 
were fired for two reasons--one for membership in the 
Demreratic party and lack of membership in the Repub-
lican party, and the other because the supervising County 
Commissioner felt that the Appellants could not be loyal 
(Findings of Fact No.8). Commissioner Jones felt he could 
not expect loyalty from the men who had contributed sub-
stantial sums to unseat him (T. 33). 
The brief of Appellants correctly states on page 3 that 
Appellants asserted aJt the trial that they were fired because 
they were members of the Democratic party and not mem-
bers of the Republican party. The second amended peti-
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tion which sets out Appellants' contentions in the pleadings 
flatly asserts at paragraph 6 that: 
"The depriving of the petitioners of their said em-
ployment, as aforesaid, was effected because of their 
association with and active support of, the Democratic 
party in Utah County, contrary to and in violation of 
said statute." 
One might compare this situation to one where a un-
ion ofilcial disliked by management is fired for two reas-
ons: membership in a union and stealing from the employ-
er. Surely this discharge would not violate a Right to Work 
Law. The Right to Work Law eovers only that situation 
where the sole reason for discharge is membership or non-
membership in a labor union or labor organization. 
Likewise, here, where such a dual motive prompted 
the discharge, the law was not violated even if it be as-
sumed that political parties were intended to be covered 
by the statute. 
POINT V 
IF UTAH'S "RIGHT TO W01RK" LAW IS INTER-
PRETED TO INCLUDE POLITICAL PARTIES WITHIN 
THE PHRASE ". . . ANY OTHER TYPE OF ASSOCIA-
TION . . .'' IT IS AN UNCO·NSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE 
OF THE PO·LICE POWER. 
The constitutionality of the "Right to Work" Laws 
has been repeatedly affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court. 
The leading case ('really two cases considered tog~ther) is 
Lincoln Federal Labor Union vs. Northwestern Iron and · 
Metal Company, 335 U. S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 251 (1959). This 
case involved a North Carolina statute and a Nebraska 
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11 
constitutional amendment which provided that no person 
in those states shall be denied an opportunity to obtain or 
retain employment because he is or is not a member of a 
labor ~anization. The constitutionality of the laws was 
affirmed. The Courts said it had: 
". . . consciously returned closer and closer to 
the earlier constitutional ·Principle that states have 
power to regulate against what are found to be injuri-
ous practices in their internal commercial and business 
affail's, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some 
specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some 
valid federal law. Just as we ~have held that the due 
process clause erects no obstaJcle to block legislative 
protection of union members, we now hold that 1~ 
lative protection can be afforded non-union workers." 
A long string of decisions have followed this case. All 
cases have been limited to labor troubles with some type of 
labor organization involved. In no case found has any 
Court even suggested applying the "Right rto Work" Laws. 
to other than labor organizations. 
There is little doubt as to the constitutionality of state 
laws which operate under the police power and which reg-
ulate economic affairs, and, in particular, regulate evil prac-
tices in labor fields. This, however, does not mean tJhart 
all state regulation in the laJbor field is constitutional; it 
is only constitutional if it is not unreasonable, or capricious, 
or arbitrary and the means selected have a real and sub-
stantial relation to rthe object sought to be obtained. If, 
" ... any other type of association ... " is inrterpreted 
to mean a political party (or any other group that is not 
connected with labor) then it becomes unreasonable and 
arbitrary, and is unconstitutional as an invalid exercise 
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12 
of the police power because i1 limits personal greedoms 
guaranteed by the United States and Utah State COnsti-
tutions. It would limit freedom without any real evil to 
be corrected. To say that irt: is reasonaJble and non-wbi-
trary to put limitations on labor unions is far different than 
to say it is reasonable and non-arbitrary to put rthe same 
limitations on all organizations of whatever kind or nature. 
A further consideration as to whether political parties 
should be included within the statute is the nature of po-
litical parties themselves. In Yuratich vs. Palaguemines 
Parish Dem. Exec. Com., La. App., 32 So. 2nd 647, 652, 
the Court noted that: 
"A political party is a voluntary association of in-
dividuaJs organized for purposes of furthering particu-
lar politieal or economic beliefs." 
United States vs. Shirley, D. C. Pa., 168 F. Supp. 382, 
385 defined a political party as: 
"a body of persons associated for the purpose of pro-
moting certain views, opinions or principles with re-
spect to the government and is not a person, fum, or 
a corporation." 
How ~can a political party satisfactorily promote its 
political and economic views and opinions if its hands are 
tied with respect to whom its candidates can hire and fire? 
There is northing inherently bad in the "spoils" system. The 
candidates of the party which wins hire those to work for 
them who have worked for and who hold co·mmon views. 
At ti·mes, the legislature has specifically withdrawn certain 
jobs from this system, but has put them under a merit sys-
tem when doing so. Some political personalities are elec-
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13 
ted specifically because they stand on a policy of ''house-
cleaning their departments ~to eliminate dead wood.'' This· 
right or .power should not be taken :from elected officials 
unless it is the clear intent of the legislature rto take it 
away. Without leaving a merit system ~in its place leaves 
"dead wood" to accwnulate. It is not clear in this case 
that it was the intent of the legislature to include political 
parties. Rather, fue· weight of evidence indicates that irt 
was not their intent to include politioal parties. S1Jarte ex· 
rei Corrigan vs. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company, 157 north-
east 2nd 331, 333, 169 Ohio State 42 defined a political par-
ty as. 
''an association of indiV!iduals whose primary purposes 
are to promote or accomplish elections or appoint-
ments to public offices, positions or jobs." 
To give an interpretation to the law which would liinit 
political parties and thus, elected officials so that they could 
not accomplish some of their goals by lrlring and firing 
would be arbitrary and unreasonable and thus, violate both 
the United States and Utah State Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents believe the phrase ''any other type of as-
sociation'' should be interpreted in accordance wifth the rules 
of Ejusdem Generis. The phrase would then read ''any 
other type of (laJbor) association''. This interpretation 
would exclude political parties from coverage by the act. 
Respondents believe that if the phrase does mean all 
associations as contended by the Appellants that the stat-
ute would be absurd and unreaso11a1ble and the Court is 
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14 
justified in adopting an interpretation which would not re-
quire absurd and unreasonable consequences. 
Respondents further take the posi!tion that even if po-
litical parties were included within the coverage of the act 
that the statute was not even violated since Appellants 
were fired for two reasons: membership in the political par-
ty and because Commissioner Jones felt they could not be 
loyal to him, their supervising Commissioner. 
Finally, Appellants urge that if Utah's Right to Work 
Laws is interpreted to include political parties, it is an un-
constitutional exercise of the state police power. 
Respondents feel that the decision of the Trial Court 
can be supported on any one of the above listed grounds. 
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE 
Utah County Attorney 
RICHARD M. TAYLOR 
275 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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